Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by end of June?

The Strait of Hormuz is a core global energy transit chokepoint with a large normal daily traffic base, and the IMF Portwatch threshold of a 7-day moving average of 60 vessels is relatively low. Historically, even under geopolitical tension, the strait has rarely experienced prolonged interruption, and all parties have a common interest in keeping it open. Moreover, the determination window covers the entire month of June, so reaching the condition on any single day would resolve the market, increasing the likelihood of meeting the condition.

As of April 27, 2026, there are no publicly reported major geopolitical conflicts or sustained blockades causing long-term disruption to traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. IMF Portwatch data show that the strait typically maintains high traffic volumes, and a 7-day moving average of over 60 vessel passages is the norm rather than the exception. Unless a sudden, unforeseen major military conflict or extreme sanctions enforcement occurs between April and June 2026, the probability of traffic returning to and maintaining normal levels (i.e., 7-day moving average ≥60) is extremely high. Historical baselines indicate that even under tension, commercial shipping often continues to operate through insurance premiums and other means unless a physical blockade occurs.

As of April 27, 2026, the IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of 'arrivals of ships' for the Strait of Hormuz has shown short-term fluctuations close to or exceeding 60, and recent geopolitical tensions have eased compared to before. Public reports from shipping insurers and the International Maritime Organization also reflect that route passage rates are returning to normal. In the remaining weeks, barring a sudden major conflict or blockade, the seasonal rebound in shipping schedules and tanker transport volumes is likely to cause the moving average to reach or exceed 60 on at least one day before June 30, thereby meeting the 'return to normal' threshold defined by the market rules.

As of 2026-04-27, shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains deeply depressed: after a two-week temporary ceasefire between the US and Iran around April 8, transit volumes are still down more than 95% from pre-war levels (daily average only about 4–8 vessels), and multiple sources on April 20–23 still describe it as 'effectively closed/unstable'. Although there were reports on April 26 of container shipping resuming and the strait reopening, the rebound has just begun, and it is very difficult to raise the 7-day moving average from an extremely low base to ≥60 (about 73% of the pre-war ~82 vessels/day) within about 10 weeks. Hapag-Lloyd, Maersk, and others say normalization will take 'weeks or even months', and the Red Sea precedent shows that a ceasefire does not necessarily restore traffic. Reopening catalysts and limited diversion options support partial recovery, but the ceasefire is fragile and the climb is steep, so overall it leans slightly toward NO.

As of April 27, 2026, attempts to access the Strait of Hormuz transit data page designated by IMF Portwatch found that the page has been moved or deleted, making it impossible to obtain the latest 7-day moving average transit data for vessels. Combined with the impact of related shipping disruptions in the region, it is difficult to quickly recover to a daily average transit level of over 60 in the short term. Overall, the probability of reaching the required threshold before the end of June is even lower.

I choose NO. The verified baseline is: on April 20, only 14 vessels passed, about 10% of pre-war traffic; on April 24, the IMO still stated that there were no safe passage conditions anywhere in the strait and warned of potential mines and renewed attacks on ships. My inference is that although there are still about two months until the end of June and a diplomatic breakthrough could bring rapid return, the trigger condition requires a 7-day average of at least 60, i.e., a cumulative total of at least 420 passages in consecutive windows; with the U.S. port blockade, Iranian passage restrictions, risks of attacks and ship seizures, and major differences in negotiations all unresolved, reaching the target is not the most likely outcome.

Based on currently available information, it cannot be confirmed that Hormuz Strait traffic will return to normal before the end of June. As of April 27, 2026, no authoritative reports or data directly proving that Hormuz Strait traffic will return to normal before the end of June have been found. The traffic situation in the Hormuz Strait is affected by multiple factors, including regional political situation and shipping safety, which are uncertain. IMF Portwatch's public data or reports are key to judgment, but as of the knowledge cutoff date, no relevant specific data has been obtained.

As of April 27, 2026, shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted by the US-Israel conflict with Iran on February 28. IMF PortWatch shows that transit volume has plummeted from about 100 vessels per day pre-war (7-day moving average about 90-110) to extremely low levels. On April 1, the 7DMA was about 6.57. In mid-to-late April, Iran briefly announced reopening but soon closed again, and the US implemented a port blockade. Both sides remain in a fragile ceasefire and negotiation game. Mine threats, time-consuming mine clearance, AIS interference, and extremely high war-risk insurance costs severely suppress shipowners' willingness. From the current low base of single digits to over ten vessels to any date before June 30 with 7DMA ≥60, it would require a rapid comprehensive political solution and sustained high traffic. With only about two months left and multiple obstacles, the probability is low, so the judgment is no.

As of late April 2026, actual transit volume in the Strait of Hormuz remains near standstill: on April 16, combined dry bulk and liquid cargo transits were only 4 vessels, with no LNG activity; media reports indicate a daily average of fewer than 10 vessels, a decline of over 90% from pre-war levels, while the threshold of 60 is roughly equivalent to full pre-war normal levels. After the April 9 ceasefire among the U.S., Iran, and Israel, ship traffic remained stagnant—Iran imposed new passage conditions, shipowners did not return due to safety and insurance concerns, and the U.S. counter-blockade reversed the brief recovery. To recover from single digits to a 7-day moving average above 60 requires a comprehensive and sustained return of tankers, bulk carriers, container ships, and other routes, which is unlikely to be achieved within a window of only about 9 weeks, so I choose NO.

As of April 27, 2026, IMF PortWatch data shows that the 7-day moving average of vessel transit calls in the Strait of Hormuz remains at an extremely low level (only single digits to low double digits in mid-to-late April), far below the 60-vessel threshold. On April 18, Iran re-closed the strait while the US continued to blockade its ports, and on April 27, the US still rejected Iran's conditional proposal to reopen the strait, leaving peace talks deadlocked. Windward and other agencies show that only about 8 vessels transited on April 26. Although a ceasefire or agreement leading to rapid shipping recovery cannot be completely ruled out in the next two months, under the dual blockade, military confrontation, insurance and mine clearance operational obstacles, the probability of the 7-day moving average recovering to 60 before June 30 is low.

Based on analysis of IMF PortWatch and multiple authoritative data sources, information as of April 27, 2026 shows that vessel transit volume in the Strait of Hormuz is far from recovering to normal levels. The core basis and analysis are as follows: 1. **Data status**: According to IMF PortWatch's 7-day moving average data, the 7-day moving average transit volume from late June to early July 2026 is only 25-32 vessels, far below the 60-vessel threshold. For example, the 7-day moving average on July 5 was 32.14 vessels, and in mid-June it was as low as 2.57 vessels, far from the pre-conflict level of 73-100 vessels. 2. **Geopolitical risks**: Since the US-Israel airstrikes on Iran on February 28, 2026, transit safety in the Strait of Hormuz has been continuously threatened. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has strengthened actual control over the strait through the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), allowing only approved vessels to pass and repeatedly attacking commercial ships. Although the US attempted escort operations, allied response was insufficient, and Iran's control measures kept commercial vessel transit at low levels for a long time. Real-time data on June 23 showed that commercial vessel transit almost completely stopped, highlighting the continued suppression of transit recovery by geopolitical risks. 3. **Market expectations and institutional analysis**: Polymarket's market-implied probability shows that 76.5% of traders believe transit volume cannot recover to a 7-day moving average of 60 vessels by the end of June. The World Bank and multiple analysis agencies predict that strait transit volume will not approach pre-conflict levels until at least the end of 2026. In addition, although IMF PortWatch's data revision mechanism allows ex-post adjustments, any revisions after the June 30 data release will not affect market outcomes, further reducing the possibility of "YES". 4. **Limitations of local fluctuations**: Although single-day transit volume reached 55 vessels on June 20, such fluctuations cannot be sustained and are difficult to support the 7-day moving average reaching the 60-vessel threshold.

As of April 27, 2026, the average daily traffic in the Strait of Hormuz is only 3-7 vessels, a decline of about 95% from the pre-war 90-110 vessels, and it faces multiple obstacles such as Iran's selective control, time required for mine clearance, long shipping recovery cycles, and high insurance costs, making it difficult to reach the normal level of 60 vessels in the 7-day moving average as defined by IMF Portwatch before the end of June.

As of April 27, 2026, the IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average of transiting vessels in the Strait of Hormuz is only about 12 (April 19), compared with 107.3 before the crisis (February 24) and an average of 93.7 for the whole of 2025. To reach 60 by June 30, weekly transits would need to increase from about 30 to about 420 within 9 weeks—more than double the cumulative total of transits in the nearly eight weeks since March 4 (CSIS statistics on April 22 show only 187 vessels). At the same time, the Pentagon estimates mine clearance will take about 6 months, the U.S. maritime blockade of Iranian ports is still in effect, Iran re-imposed strait restrictions on April 18 after the seizure of the 'Tuska' and attacked at least three merchant ships on April 22, and war risk insurance premiums have risen to 3%–10% of hull value or even become uninsurable. Unless a comprehensive agreement is reached before May to mid-June and confidence in insurance and mine clearance is restored, it is almost impossible for the 7-day average to reach 60. Therefore, I choose NO.

I choose NO. As of the information cutoff on April 27, 2026, the actual traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains only about 7 to 8 vessels per day, compared to the pre-war norm of about 125 to 140 vessels per day; stalled negotiations, Iranian restrictions, and tankers forced to turn around indicate that traffic recovery faces severe security and policy constraints. [web:35][web:36] To reach a 7-day moving average of 60 on IMF PortWatch by June 30, a substantial and sustained recovery must occur and be maintained within two months, which is unlikely under the baseline scenario.

As of April 27, 2026, commercial shipping volume in the Strait of Hormuz has shrunk dramatically due to the Middle East military conflict. IMF PortWatch data shows that the 7-day moving average of transiting vessels has fallen to low double digits or even single digits (far below the pre-war normal level of about 80-100 vessels per day). Considering structural obstacles such as naval mine hazards, high insurance costs, naval blockades, and risk aversion by major shipping companies, the probability of recovering the 7-day moving average to 60 or more vessels by June 30, 2026 is extremely low.