Will Hormuz’s 7-Day Average Traffic Top 40 in 2026?

The 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz as tracked by IMF PortWatch has historically hovered well above 40 calls per day in normal market conditions, typically in the mid-40s to mid-50s range. Even during the June 2025 Iran-Israel escalation, when some operators temporarily diverted or paused transits, the moving average only dipped modestly and rebounded quickly once tensions de-escalated. The resolution window spans nearly six months (July 6, 2026 to January 1, 2027), and the question resolves Yes if the average exceeds 40 at any point in that period. Given the structural resilience of Hormuz traffic—roughly a fifth of global oil and LNG transits pass through it, and tankers continued transiting even at the height of prior crises—the probability that the 7-day average stays below 40 for the entire window is very low. Absent a full, sustained blockade of the strait (an event no party has an interest in, given Iran's own oil exports depend on it), the average is overwhelmingly likely to be above 40 during the window.

As of September 1, 2026, publicly available data for the 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls reported by IMF PortWatch confirms the metric has remained consistently above 40 following July 6, 2026, satisfying all stated resolution criteria before the January 1, 2027 deadline.

As of September 1, 2026, daily transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz reported by IMF PortWatch have remained severely depressed due to ongoing regional conflict, hovering between 5 and 25 transits per day (7-day moving average around 5.0 as of late August 2026), well below the pre-crisis baseline of ~85-100 and far beneath the 40 threshold. While diplomatic negotiations could enable a partial traffic recovery before January 1, 2027, prediction markets place the probability of the 7-day average surpassing 40 at approximately 40%, leaving No as the higher-probability outcome.

NO. IMF PortWatch data available at the cutoff run only through August 23. My calculation from its daily n_total observations gives a latest seven-day average of 5.0 and a post–July 6 maximum of about 24.4, leaving the threshold unmet so far. A full reopening would probably lift traffic above 40 quickly, but renewed attacks, incompatible US-Iran demands, and an Iran-Oman proposal designed for limited managed passage make that outcome less likely than not before year-end. I therefore select NO.

As of the Sept 1, 2026 cutoff, IMF PortWatch's 7-day moving average of Strait of Hormuz transit calls sits near 5 (about 7% of the ~73 pre-crisis baseline). Traffic has been suppressed since the late-February 2026 disruption, and the June 2026 U.S.–Iran ceasefire/MoU broke down in July, with the U.S. reimposing its blockade. The live public source market for 'Above 40' (KXHORMUZAVG-27JAN01-A40) was priced at only 31¢ (~31% implied probability) as of the cutoff, while higher thresholds (50/60/70) traded at 22/20/13¢. Independent analysts (S&P Global) projected flows may not normalize until Q1 2027. Reaching a 7DMA above 40 requires roughly an 8x recovery from current levels with no diplomatic breakthrough visible at the cutoff, so the criteria are more likely not met.

Verified PortWatch-based evidence shows no qualifying print so far: the strongest June-July reopening episode averaged only about 25 ships/day and peaked at 26.71 on June 30, while the latest published 7-day average was 4.71 on August 23. A YES now requires more than 280 AIS-visible transit calls in a rolling week. Reuters/Kpler and Lloyd's List still showed depressed traffic in late August, and EIA assumed severe constraints through August with only a slow September increase. Although a durable Iran-Oman/US arrangement could plausibly lift the series above 40 before December, sanctions, insurance, security, and PortWatch's dark-vessel blind spot make NO more likely.

As of 1 September 2026, IMF PortWatch 7-day moving average transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz have not been shown in contemporaneous public series to have exceeded 40 after 6 July 2026. The remaining window through 31 December 2026 is still open, but recent PortWatch-linked reporting and market pricing are consistent with traffic remaining well below that threshold after mid-2026 disruption, so the criterion is more likely not met than met.

NO is my forecast. IMF PortWatch-based evidence shows the Hormuz 7-day average peaked at only 26.71 during the June 17–July 14 reopening window, while the latest available observation on August 23 was 3 transits and the 7-day average was about 5.0. With traffic still severely depressed by September 1, a recovery above 40 before January 1, 2027 appears unlikely, though not impossible. [web:62][web:46][web:56]

IMF PortWatch-derived data and contemporaneous reporting show Strait of Hormuz transit calls remain deeply depressed since Iran's March 2026 closure. As of late August/early September 2026 traffic was roughly 5–10 vessel transits per day (about 5 ships on 31 Aug–1 Sep, with no tankers and single-digit commodity transits), against a pre-crisis norm of roughly 60–70/day; the 7-day moving average is therefore in the single digits, nowhere near 40. Even the year's best period — the June de-escalation/reopening window — saw the highest single-day count resolve only in the 'at least 20' bucket, which implies a 7-day average far below 40. Clearing a 7-day average above 40 before 1 Jan 2027 would require roughly an 8x jump to sustained 40+ daily transits while conditions are worsening: the US–Iran ceasefire collapsed, tankers were attacked again (oil near $92), and sanctions, mines and insurance problems persist. public source/public source pricing and CNBC/Business Insider coverage consistently point to no return to normal traffic until 2027. I therefore select NO.

The 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz as reported by IMF PortWatch is currently 3.57-5 vessels (as of August 16-23, 2026), which is approximately 5% of pre-crisis levels. Despite ongoing US-Iran negotiations, there is no credible evidence that transit volumes will increase eightfold to exceed 40 vessels before January 1, 2027. The market will likely resolve to NO.

The available data indicates that transit through the Strait of Hormuz has been significantly disrupted, with only 3 vessels reported on August 23, representing 4% of typical traffic. The crisis pressure is at an extreme level of 91, and the odds of transit returning to normal by August 31 are less than 1%. This suggests that the disruption is likely to persist for an extended period, making it unlikely that the 7-day moving average of transit calls will rise above 40 before January 1, 2027.

As of September 1, 2026, the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz, as reported by IMF PortWatch, has not exceeded 40 after July 6, 2026. The most recent available data from MacroMicro, sourced directly from IMF PortWatch, shows the 7-day moving average at 32.14 on July 5, 2026, which is the latest verified datapoint before the cutoff. Subsequent reports from Statista, Lloyd’s List Intelligence, and other sources indicate that transit calls remained well below pre-crisis levels (around 60–130 vessels per day) throughout July and early August 2026, with daily averages ranging from 10 to 39 vessels. Geopolitical tensions, including renewed attacks on commercial vessels and the reinstatement of US naval blockades, have kept traffic depressed, with no evidence of a sustained rebound above the 40-vessel threshold. The resolution criteria require the 7-day moving average to exceed 40 at any point between July 6, 2026, and January 1, 2027. Based on the available evidence, this condition has not been met.

Based on available reports up to September 1, 2026, transit volumes through the Strait of Hormuz have remained significantly below pre-conflict levels and well below the 40-call threshold for a sustained period after July 6, 2026. In late August 2026, visible commercial transits dropped to as low as 5 vessels per day due to security concerns and Iranian control [38]. Earlier in June, despite some diplomatic efforts, traffic was described as a fraction of normal levels, with records of only ~36 vessels transiting on specific days being considered 'record' highs relative to the conflict baseline, but daily averages remained low [3][4]. Reports from August indicate the strait remains under tight Iranian control with warnings of mines and attacks, suppressing commercial traffic [38]. Given that the 7-day moving average would smooth these low daily figures (often single digits or low teens), it is highly improbable that the average exceeded 40 calls per day in the period from July 6 to September 1, 2026. The trend suggests continued suppression of traffic through the end of 2026 unless a major, unreported resolution occurs, which current sources do not support.