Will Israel or the US target an Iranian nuclear facility?

As of February 26, 2026, military strikes by the US and Israel against Iran are on the verge of happening. US President Trump has explicitly set a 10-15 day negotiation deadline and threatened that if no agreement is reached, 'very bad things' will happen. The US military has assembled a large fleet in the region, including two aircraft carriers (Ford and Lincoln), and has deployed aerial refueling tankers and stealth fighters to Israel. Israeli intelligence assessments consider it feasible to strike Iranian nuclear facilities in the first half of 2025 or in the near future, and the Netanyahu government has long advocated military means to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. Given the extremely high risk of negotiation breakdown and the US readiness for kinetic strikes, the probability of strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities before the deadline is very high.

As of February 26, 2026, the US military has completed its largest deployment in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq War, including dual carrier strike groups (USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford), B-2 stealth bombers, and a large number of fighter jets and air defense positions. The US-Iran nuclear negotiations in Geneva have stalled, with the US insisting that Iran completely dismantle its nuclear facilities and hand over enriched uranium, while Iran refuses to accept the relevant terms. Israel and the US are highly coordinated in their strategy toward Iran, listing the elimination of Iran's nuclear threat as a core goal, and have completed strike plans for nuclear facilities and research bases such as Parchin and Natanz. With the risk of US-Iran negotiations breaking down extremely high and military deployment fully in place, the possibility of the US and Israel conducting kinetic military strikes on nuclear facilities inside Iran before February 28, 2026 is extremely high.

As of February 26, 2026, the US and Israel have completed large-scale military deployments around Iran, Trump is clearly considering military strikes, the US-Iran negotiations have huge differences, Iran's nuclear facilities have upgraded defenses, and multiple sources indicate that kinetic strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities are highly likely within the next 3 days.

As of February 26, 2026, public information shows that various "endgame" indicators for a US-Israeli military operation against Iran have appeared simultaneously, with rare intensity. Military level: The US military has completed its largest force buildup in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq War—two carrier strike groups (Lincoln and Ford), F-35/F-22/F-16 transfers to European and Middle Eastern bases, Patriot and THAAD anti-missile positions moved forward, B-2 stealth bombers on standby at Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford in the UK, and over 200 cargo flights delivering equipment to regional bases. Political level: Trump issued a "10 to 15 days" ultimatum on February 19 and explicitly stated he would not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons; the US core demands are zero enrichment, a 20-year halt to enrichment, and the handover of approximately 440 kg of 60% enriched uranium, while Iran only proposed a three-phase plan for a 15-year suspension, which Trump called "completely unacceptable"—there is no overlap on the most critical terms. Evacuation level: The US ordered the evacuation of non-essential personnel and family members from the Beirut embassy on February 23, and multiple countries issued travel warnings urging citizens to leave Iran on the same day—such orderly evacuations typically occur days before a strike. Verification level: The IAEA has had no access to Iran's four declared enrichment facilities since June 2025, making it impossible to verify stockpile size, composition, and location; this "verification vacuum" is itself a core basis for Washington and Jerusalem to argue the necessity of military action. The continued operation of the Geneva channel is the only substantive counter-evidence, but the precedent of June 2025 shows that scheduled talks not only fail to provide protection but actually provide tactical surprise for a raid. The real uncertainty is only in the timing: the market window closes at US Eastern Time on February 28, leaving only about three days, while the literal arithmetic of the ultimatum falls between March 1 and 6. After weighing, I believe that "days-level" precursor signals such as the evacuation order and stealth fighters deployed to Israel are more indicative of the actual launch time than the literal date of the ultimatum.

My judgment is YES, with a probability of about 70%. As of 2026-02-26 00:00:30Z, the United States has been preparing for possible military action against Iran lasting several weeks, and Trump has given a 10-15 day deadline for a nuclear deal, publicly threatening that if there is no deal, 'very bad things' will happen. [web:76][web:79] Iran refuses to give up its core demand of uranium enrichment, and previous reports indicate that the US is considering limited strikes to force Iranian concessions; since nuclear facilities and enrichment capabilities are at the center of the dispute, I believe that kinetic strikes against nuclear facilities before February 28 are slightly more likely. [web:6]

As of February 26, 2026, the US and Iran held the third round of nuclear negotiations in Geneva, but differences on core issues remain: the US demands that Iran dismantle the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear facilities and ship all enriched uranium to the US, while Iran refuses to give up its right to peaceful nuclear technology and is unwilling to send nuclear materials out of the country. The Trump administration issued a 10-15 day ultimatum starting February 20, and Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio both stated on February 25 that they have evidence of Iran rebuilding its nuclear weapons program. Trump again warned on February 24 that 'bad things' would happen if negotiations fail. Meanwhile, the US military has conducted its largest Middle East buildup since the Iraq War, including the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group heading to the region, and Israel has conducted preemptive strikes against Iranian proxies. With the diplomatic window only about 48 hours remaining and core red lines unresolved, the risk of Israel or the US launching kinetic strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities has significantly increased.

My judgment is YES, but only slightly favored. Verified public indications show that the US military has completed a rapid buildup far beyond what is needed for general deterrence, with deployment scale exceeding that before the June 2025 strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, and has deployed F-22s directly to Israel. Although the US and Iran are about to continue negotiations, core conditions such as enrichment rights remain incompatible, and US officials have described this round of negotiations as Iran's last chance to avoid large-scale action. My inference is that if the negotiations fail to produce a credible breakthrough, the US and Israel may use the already-ready forces to launch an operation before the deadline; since the nuclear program is the core reason for the threat, negotiations, and deployment, the probability that the operation effectively hits at least one qualifying nuclear-related facility is relatively high. However, the president has not publicly made a decision, and the diplomatic window still exists, so confidence is only moderate.

As of February 26, 2026, the US military is massing in the Middle East on a large scale, the third round of indirect US-Iran nuclear negotiations in Geneva is described by many as difficult and a 'final showdown', the US insists on Iran's complete dismantlement of its nuclear program, and Israeli officials publicly say that US military action against Iran is 'only a matter of time'. The settlement window has only about two and a half days left, and the strike forces are already in place; once negotiations break down, action can be taken immediately. On balance, the probability of a kinetic strike by the US and Israel on Iran's nuclear facilities within the window is slightly higher than not happening.

As of February 26, 2026, there is no conclusive public evidence that the United States or Israel has decided or carried out kinetic military strikes on any nuclear facility in Iran. Official statements from both countries emphasize using diplomatic and deterrent means to curb Iran's nuclear program while preventing escalation into a full-scale war, so the risk of kinetic attack is assessed as low, but cannot be completely ruled out.

As of February 26, 2026, the US and Iran are conducting the third round of indirect negotiations in Geneva on the nuclear issue. Although there is no immediate agreement, mediators say there has been progress and technical talks are planned for next week. The US demands that Iran dismantle its nuclear facilities and hand over highly enriched uranium, which Iran explicitly rejects. Trump previously threatened that 'bad things' would happen if there is no agreement, and the US military has completed a large-scale buildup in the Middle East. However, the resolution window is only until February 28, diplomatic channels remain open, and the probability of kinetic strikes on nuclear facilities in the short term is low. It is more likely to continue pressure or wait for further breakdown of negotiations. Based on history (June 2025 strike) and current posture, the likelihood of no action in the short term is higher.

As of February 26, 2026, the US and Iran were originally scheduled to hold nuclear negotiations in Geneva on that day, and diplomatic channels remain open; previously, Netanyahu submitted a new plan to Trump for striking Iran and stated that Iran's nuclear restart must be prevented, but in January he asked Trump to postpone the US attack. Considering the narrow 48-hour window and no public signs of imminent war, the probability of kinetic strikes on nuclear facilities in the short term is assessed as low, but tail risks after negotiation breakdown cannot be ruled out.

As of February 26, 2026, there is no public information indicating that Israel or the United States plans to launch a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.

Based on information available before February 26, 2026, the likelihood of Israel or the United States launching a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities before the end of February is low, for the following reasons: 1. **Diplomatic negotiations are ongoing**: As of February 26, the US and Iran have held multiple rounds of indirect negotiations in Oman and Geneva, Switzerland, and both sides remain in contact on key issues such as the nuclear issue and sanctions. Although no substantive breakthrough has been achieved, both sides have indicated they will continue dialogue, showing that diplomatic resolution remains the preferred path. For example, in the third round of negotiations in Geneva on February 26, both sides agreed to continue further consultations on the nuclear issue and sanctions. Analysts warn that a breakdown could trigger military conflict, but there are no clear signs of military action in the short term. Additionally, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi reiterated in the negotiations that Iran has no intention of developing nuclear weapons and emphasized the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy; despite a tough stance, diplomatic space remains. (Shanghai Securities News, CNBC, Foreign Policy, Arms Control Association) 2. **Deterrent nature of military deployment**: The US military deployment in the Middle East (such as dual carrier battle groups, F-22 fighters, etc.) is unprecedented in scale, but its main purpose is deterrence rather than direct strikes. For example, the US deployed two carrier battle groups (USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Gerald R. Ford) and over 100 fighter jets in February, but Pentagon and White House officials have repeatedly emphasized that the military deployment is intended to prevent escalation and support diplomatic negotiations. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has stressed that he will 'never allow Iran to rebuild nuclear capabilities', but has not explicitly stated that military action will be taken before the end of February, and the Israeli Defense Forces' statements also focus on 'maintaining deterrence' rather than 'imminent use of force'. (Military Times, CSIS, Israel Hayom) 3. **Current status of Iranian nuclear facilities and intelligence assessments**: According to assessments by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and US intelligence agencies, although Iran has accelerated the reconstruction of nuclear facilities (such as Natanz, Fordow) after the US-Israeli joint strike in June 2025, its nuclear capability is unlikely to recover to a threatening level in the short term. The IAEA's February report noted that Iranian nuclear facilities were severely damaged and could not confirm details of highly enriched uranium stockpiles and activities, but found no direct evidence of Iran restarting weaponization. US and Israeli intelligence assessments also believe that Iran's nuclear program has been 'severely weakened' and is unlikely to pose a direct threat in the short term, reducing the urgency for immediate military action. (IAEA, rntJUQQF, 75xRUW8J) 4. **International opposition and risks**: Unilateral military strikes by the US and Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities would face strong international opposition, especially diplomatic pressure from China, Russia, and the EU. For example, the EU warned in August 2025 that it would restart the snapback sanctions mechanism on Iran, but also emphasized the priority of diplomatic resolution. Moreover, military action could trigger regional escalation, accelerate Iran's nuclear weaponization, and further deteriorate Middle East security. Therefore, the US and Israel need to weigh international reactions and long-term risks before using force, making hasty action in the short term unlikely. (X0p0yYEO, TwBAlzGj) 5. **Time window and decision pressure**: According to market rules, the judgment deadline is before February 28, 2026. Considering that diplomatic negotiations are ongoing and Iran's nuclear capability is unlikely to recover in the short term, the time pressure for the US and Israel to strike before the end of February is not urgent. Israeli and US decision-makers are more likely to consider military options only after diplomatic efforts completely break down or when there is a major breakthrough in Iranian nuclear activities. **Uncertainties and risks**: - Uncertainty in diplomatic negotiations: If Iran makes substantive concessions (such as freezing enrichment activities), the likelihood of military action will further decrease. However, Iran's official stance is tough, leaving limited room for concessions. - Divergence in intelligence assessments: Israeli intelligence believes the Iranian nuclear threat still exists, while US intelligence assessments are relatively cautious, which may affect joint US-Israeli decision-making. - Iran's reaction: If the US and Israel strike, Iran may retaliate through proxy groups (such as Hezbollah, Houthis), leading to regional escalation. In summary, despite the tough stance of the US and Israel on the Iranian nuclear issue, given that diplomatic negotiations are ongoing, Iran's nuclear capability is unlikely to recover in the short term, and international opposition is high, the likelihood of military strikes before the end of February is low. Therefore, 'NO' is chosen as the main judgment.

As of February 26, 2026, relevant public information shows that neither the United States nor Israel has recently released any clear official signal of directly striking nuclear facilities inside Iran before the end of February 2026. Such high-risk military actions usually have extensive diplomatic early warnings in advance, and the current remaining time window is extremely short, making the possibility of an effective strike that meets the criteria relatively lower.

Based on historical patterns and the extremely short forecast window (about 2-3 days), the likelihood of Israel or the US launching kinetic military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities is low. Such actions require extensive prior preparation and military deployment, and represent a major escalation. While Israeli-Iranian tensions persist, both countries typically prefer cyber operations, sanctions, and diplomacy over direct military strikes when dealing with Iran's nuclear program. Even in Israel's retaliatory strikes against Iran in 2024, the targets were mainly military facilities rather than nuclear facilities.