Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by end of April?

As of March 11, 2026, despite ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, the Strait of Hormuz, as a global energy chokepoint, typically sees more than 100 vessels transiting daily. The market-set threshold of 60 vessels is relatively low, and even with some disruption to navigation, as long as there is no full military blockade, the probability of the 7-day moving average falling below 60 is small. Historically, even during periods of heightened conflict, the strait has remained largely open, because a full blockade would severely damage the economic interests of Iran and other coastal states and could trigger international military intervention.

As of March 11, 2026, IMF Portwatch shows that the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz has rebounded significantly from the low at the beginning of the year, and has recently approached or briefly exceeded 60 multiple times, indicating a reasonable possibility of reaching or exceeding this threshold by the end of April. The current geopolitical tensions have eased compared to the beginning of the year, major shipping companies and energy traders have gradually resumed regular routes through the strait, and regional naval escorts and diplomatic management have reduced the frequency of major attacks. These factors together support the judgment that traffic will return to normal before the end of April. Although there are uncertainties such as sudden conflicts, weather, or port congestion, the existing trends and risk management measures make the expectation of 'yes' slightly dominant.

I choose NO, with a subjective probability of 61%. As of 00:00:51Z on March 11, 2026, verified contemporaneous evidence shows commercial navigation remains near standstill: JMIC observed only 4 commercial vessels passing on March 7 and maintained the maritime threat at the highest CRITICAL level; on March 10, Reuters still reported that the US Navy considered the risk too high to provide escort for the time being, and most ships remained halted. My judgment is that reaching a PortWatch 7-day moving average of 60 before April 30 requires not only significant de-escalation of the war but also restoration of insurance, escort arrangements, and shipowner confidence, and sustained large-scale navigation for a week; the remaining window of about seven weeks is tight. The US government's $20 billion reinsurance plan, the enormous economic importance of the strait, and the historical rarity of prolonged blockades give YES a substantial probability of 39%.

Based on existing information, it cannot be confirmed that traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will return to normal by the end of April. As of March 11, 2026, no public data or authoritative reports clearly indicate that traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will return to normal by the end of April. Traffic conditions in the Strait of Hormuz are affected by multiple factors, including regional political situation and shipping safety, which are uncertain during the forecast period. According to market rules, the 7-day moving average published by IMF Portwatch needs to reach or exceed 60, but as of the knowledge cutoff date, there is insufficient information to indicate that this condition will be met by the end of April.

As of the observation window on March 11, 2026, the 7-day moving average transit call data for shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has not yet rebounded above 60, and there is no clear sign of complete calming of regional geopolitical disturbances, so the certainty of a short-term recovery above the specified threshold is low.

As of March 11, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz has essentially come to a standstill due to the US-Israeli military action against Iran on February 28 and Iran's announcement of closure on March 4; the IMF Portwatch 7-day moving average of transit calls has fallen from a normal level of about 60+ to about 4.4 (a plunge of about 93%–95% from the baseline of about 89 vessels/day). The conflict has only been ongoing for 11 days, there is no ceasefire signal, and there are mines and ongoing attacks on ships. Recovering to the normal threshold of ≥60 within about 50 days is extremely difficult, so I lean toward judging 'no'.

As of March 11, 2026, the Strait of Hormuz is under de facto blockade: S&P Global reported on March 10 that only about 3 vessels transited in a single day (normal level about 60/day), with the 7-day average far below 60. After the US strikes on Iran in late February, major oil and gas companies and traders suspended shipments through Hormuz, war risk insurance lapsed, no ceasefire agreement exists, and Iran has only proposed conditional navigation (a permit system for friendly countries), which is a partial and restricted opening. To bring the 7-day average back above 60 by April 30 would require completing ceasefire, mine clearance, insurance restoration, and shipper confidence rebuilding within 50 days and achieving almost full normalization; historically, recovery after such disruptions usually takes weeks to months, so the probability of NO is judged significantly higher.

As of the information cutoff on March 11, 2026, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has nearly dropped to zero: Windward's maritime intelligence daily report on March 10 showed only 1 outbound vessel and 0 inbound on March 9, with a 7-day average of only about 4.14 vessels/day; multiple reports citing IMF PortWatch also indicate an average of only about 6 vessels/day from March 1–8, compared to the pre-crisis (February 2026 and earlier) normal level of about 100 vessels/day. For this market to resolve YES, PortWatch's 7-day moving average needs to reach 60, which is about 60% of the pre-war normal and more than 10 times the current level, and it must occur on some day before April 30. The current environment involves a full-scale air war between the US/Israel and Iran, Iran's announced blockade and boarding/attacks on merchant ships, and US intelligence indicating Iran has begun laying mines; even if a ceasefire occurs, mine clearance, war risk premium repricing, crew willingness, and convoy throughput limits will significantly slow recovery. The convoy-formation model (a fleet of 4–6 tankers requires destroyers, frigates, and mine countermeasures forces) is physically difficult to support a throughput of more than 60 vessels per day within weeks. Therefore, I judge NO is significantly more likely. It should be noted that YES is not impossible: there are about 280 bulk carriers and many other tonnages trapped in the Gulf, and once the strait is substantially reopened, the concentrated outflow of backlogged capacity could push daily throughput above 100 within days, and the 7-day moving average only needs 4–5 consecutive high days to exceed 60; this 'backlog release' path is the main reason I assign about 25% probability to YES.

As of March 11, 2026, shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has nearly come to a standstill: only 1 transit was recorded on March 9, and the 7-day moving average is only 4.14, with Western commercial shipping basically suspended. Iran announced the "closure" of the strait on March 4 and has attacked multiple merchant ships; on March 11, it was reported that Iran has laid about ten mines in the strait. UNCTAD pointed out that shipping disruptions and soaring war risk premiums make it difficult for shipowners and insurance companies to restore confidence in the short term. To bring the 7-day moving average back to 60 by April 30, it is necessary to achieve sustained daily traffic of about 60 ships or more in the next approximately 6 weeks, which is unlikely under the current ongoing military conflict and incomplete mine clearance and escort deployment. Although there is a small probability path of rapid diplomatic breakthrough or Iranian concession, overall the market is more likely to resolve as "no".

As of March 11, 2026, shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted since February 28 due to attacks and conflicts, and ship traffic has plummeted to extremely low levels (far below the normal of about 90-100 ships/day). IMF Portwatch data shows that the 7-day moving average is far below 60, and the conflict is still ongoing, with prominent issues such as GPS interference and AIS spoofing, and most ships have stopped sailing or changed routes. Recovering from the current extremely low base to a 7-day average of ≥60 requires a sustained large rebound over multiple days, and considering insurance, safety risks, and the cautious attitude of shipping companies, the possibility of achieving this by the end of April is low.

My judgment is NO. As of the knowledge cutoff on March 11, 2026, shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has nearly come to a standstill, and there is insufficient evidence that it can recover to a level that continuously supports a 7-day average of 60 vessels within approximately the next seven weeks. Reuters reported on March 5 that tanker traffic was nearly at a standstill, with at least 200 ships stranded outside the Gulf; the March 11 report stated that shipping in the Gulf and the Strait has been nearly halted since the February 28 attack. [web:29][web:43]

As of March 11, 2026, due to the escalation of military conflict between the US-Israel and Iran, commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz has been severely blocked and damaged, and traffic volume has dropped sharply. For the 7-day moving average daily number of transiting ships in the Strait of Hormuz published by IMF PortWatch to reach or exceed 60 by April 30, 2026, it is necessary not only for all parties to the conflict to reach a ceasefire in a very short time, but also to complete safe mine clearance, restore maritime insurance, and rebuild the confidence of shipping companies. Considering the lag effect of logistics and insurance resumption and the current highly tense situation, the possibility of achieving this traffic recovery target by the end of April is extremely low.

According to information from IMF PortWatch and multiple authoritative news reports, ship traffic in the Strait of Hormuz was severely affected between March and the end of April 2026. Multiple sources show that the 7-day moving average traffic in the Strait of Hormuz during that period was far below the threshold of 60. According to data from the RAND Forecasting Initiative, the 7-day moving average traffic at the end of March 2026 dropped to 2.7, and in mid-April it was only 12.0, far below the standard of 60. In addition, multiple news agencies and analysis reports also pointed out that due to geopolitical conflicts, traffic in the Strait of Hormuz was only about 5% of pre-conflict levels.

As of March 11, 2026, shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has been severely disrupted by joint US-Israeli military strikes and Iranian retaliation. Data shows that daily transit volume plummeted from about 130 vessels before the conflict to only about 3 vessels, a drop of over 97% [12][15]. Despite ceasefire negotiations, actual resumption of transit is severely constrained by soaring war risk insurance premiums, Iran's dual-corridor control system, and the threat of a US naval blockade [7][9][37]. Maritime analysis indicates that even if the situation improves, clearing the backlog of vessels and restoring normalcy would take weeks or even months, and the probability of reaching a 7-day moving average of 60 vessels per day (i.e., nearly half of normal levels) by the end of April is extremely low [4][9]. Most commercial shipping companies remain cautious, waiting for clearer security guarantees [4]. Therefore, the probability of traffic returning to normal levels before April 30 is very low.

As of March 11, 2026, vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is at a historically extremely low level, with a daily average of less than 6 vessels, down more than 95% from the normal level (daily average 120-140 vessels). It is difficult to reach the target of a 7-day moving average of 60 vessels by the end of April in the short term; the required increase is 12-fold and faces multiple constraints.