Yes
Option AThe resolution criteria are met before the stated deadline.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if a state of ceasefire remains in effect between Israel and Iran through the listed date, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time (IRST). Otherwise this market will resolve to “No”. A state of ceasefire will be considered to no longer be in effect between Israel and Iran if either Israel or Iran takes a qualifying military action against the other country between market creation and the listed date, 11:59 PM IRST. A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by Israel or Iran, that directly impacts the other country. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles. The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action: Munitions destroyed or intercepted before impact; Surface-to-air missile strikes; Small-arms fire; Ground incursions; Cyber operations; Naval gunfire and artillery fire; Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems); Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes; Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed. Any munition that is intercepted or destroyed before impact does not constitute a qualifying military action. Debris, fragments, or any wreckage from intercepted munitions that land on Israel or Iran do not constitute a military action regardless of any damage incurred. A military action will be considered to impact Israel or Iran if it directly impacts the terrestrial territory of Israel or Iran, including any internal waters. Maritime territory and airspace are not encompassed. Where territorial borders are disputed, all territory claimed by and under the de facto control of the relevant state as of market creation will qualify. The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (IRST) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. If, at the end of the third calendar day, conflicting reports remain as to the occurrence, attribution, or timing of the action, this market will resolve based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of Israel and Iran and credible reporting.
The resolution criteria are met before the stated deadline.
The resolution criteria are not met before the stated deadline.
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As of 28 August 2026 there is no signed Israel-Iran ceasefire document, but there is a durable de facto bilateral lull that satisfies this market's narrow operational test: no Israeli air or surface-to-surface strike has impacted Iranian soil, and no Iranian missile or drone has impacted Israeli soil, since roughly 7-8 June 2026. Critically, the active war is primarily a US-Iran war: US strikes inside Iran and Iran's counter-pressure via the Strait of Hormuz, commercial shipping and Gulf states do not qualify under these rules, which count only actions initiated by Israel or Iran that directly impact the other's territory. The most instructive evidence is the July renewed-hostilities phase: even while US strikes hit Iranian territory, Iran did not launch qualifying strikes at Israel, indicating a deliberate Iranian choice to decouple Israel from its response to Washington. Since early August, when Trump pulled back from a threatened multi-day campaign, the pattern has been weeks without confirmed strikes inside Iran, and the administration has publicly pivoted to economic coercion and an 'economic isolation' plan rather than a new air campaign; Trump said on 18 August that no talks are underway, but also framed pressure in sanctions terms. Israel is being actively restrained: Defense Minister Katz stated Israel 'very much' wants to strike Iranian energy targets but the US 'is not approving it at the moment' out of concern Iran would hit neighbouring states and trigger an oil crisis. Gulf and other mediation continues. The resolution criteria further favour YES by excluding intercepted munitions and debris, covert sabotage, FPV and short-range loitering munitions, artillery, cyber, ground incursions, Israeli action against Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and all US-initiated strikes on Iran. Against that, the tail risk is real and concentrated in one pathway: if the US resumes a major campaign, Israeli assessments hold that Iran would fire ballistic missiles at Israel even if the IDF stayed out, and Israeli security figures are pressing for escalation. I estimate roughly a 15% chance of a major renewed US campaign in the remaining 33 days with roughly a coin-flip conditional probability that Iran then hits Israeli territory, plus smaller independent risks from a unilateral or US-approved Israeli strike and from Iranian retaliation for Israeli action in Lebanon. That aggregates to about 14% NO. public source has priced this market in the high-80s, consistent with my estimate. I select YES.
YES. As of the August 28, 2026 cutoff, I found no credible report of a qualifying direct Israeli strike impacting Iran or Iranian strike impacting Israel since this market opened on July 16. The broader conflict remains active, but US–Iran attacks, maritime incidents, and fighting involving Hezbollah do not independently satisfy this market’s narrow trigger. Direct Israel–Iran fire has remained paused since June 8, and current US policy favors economic pressure over renewed attacks. I assign an 86% probability that this restraint lasts through September 30, while retaining meaningful downside risk from the collapsed diplomatic process and escalating Israel–Hezbollah fighting.
As of the knowledge cutoff date 2026-08-28, there have been no confirmed qualifying military actions as defined by the resolution rules between Israel and Iran, and no credible reports of planned large-scale air or surface-to-surface strikes targeting each other's terrestrial territory that meet the ceasefire-breaking criteria have emerged. Given the remaining period to September 30 is relatively short and neither side has signaled intent to carry out qualifying strikes, the ceasefire is highly likely to hold through the deadline.
As of August 28, 2026, no qualifying military action (direct airstrike or surface-to-surface missile strike directly impacting the terrestrial territory of Israel or Iran initiated by either state) has occurred to break the ceasefire since market creation. Previous sub-period markets for July and August 2026 have all resolved to 'YES', and current prediction market pricing as of late August 2026 reflects an 80–85% probability that the ceasefire will hold through September 30, 2026, making 'YES' the most likely resolution outcome.
No qualifying Israel-Iran military action has occurred since this market opened on July 16, 2026 - every shorter-dated market in the series (July 18 through August 15) has already resolved Yes, and the September 30 contract trades around 88-89% Yes. The post-July 8 phase of the 2026 Iran war is a US-Iran naval and economic standoff over the Strait of Hormuz, with Israel absent from direct strikes on Iran since June 8 and Iran having fired no missiles at Israeli territory since then. The only near-miss (July 19: an Iranian missile aimed at Jordan's Aqaba airport, intercepted, with debris near Eilat) is explicitly non-qualifying under the rules. With ~33 days remaining, de-escalatory factors (Rubio's August 25 signal that no major US combat operations are expected until after the midterms, Iran-Oman transit deals, Iran's heavily degraded missile arsenal, Israel's focus on Lebanon) favor the ceasefire holding, though the June precedent - Israeli strikes on Beirut triggering direct Iranian missile retaliation - and a foiled Iranian plot against Netanyahu's son keep the risk of a breakdown material. I price Yes somewhat below the market to reflect the live Lebanon-escalation channel.
As of August 28, 2026, the ceasefire between Israel and Iran, established through the Islamabad Memorandum in June 2026, remains precariously in effect but has been repeatedly violated by both sides. The ceasefire was intended to halt large-scale military actions and facilitate negotiations toward a final settlement, but low-intensity hostilities, particularly through proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, have persisted. Key evidence from credible sources indicates the following: - The ceasefire framework, agreed upon in June 2026, included a halt to hostilities and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. However, both Israel and Iran have accused each other of violations, particularly regarding attacks in Lebanon and intermittent strikes on military infrastructure. - Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon, targeting Hezbollah (an Iranian proxy), have continued despite the ceasefire, with both sides interpreting the agreement differently regarding its applicability to Lebanon. Israel maintains that the ceasefire does not cover Lebanon, while Iran and Pakistan (the mediators) assert that it does. - Iran has also been accused of violating the ceasefire by continuing to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz, charging tolls for passage, and launching indirect attacks through allied groups in Iraq and Yemen. - No direct, qualifying military action (as defined by the resolution criteria: air strikes or surface-to-surface missile strikes impacting the terrestrial territory of Israel or Iran) has been credibly reported between Israel and Iran since the June ceasefire. However, the risk of escalation remains high due to ongoing proxy conflicts and mutual accusations of ceasefire violations. Given the resolution criteria, the ceasefire is considered to remain in effect as no qualifying military action directly impacting the terrestrial territory of Israel or Iran has been confirmed. The persistent low-intensity conflict and proxy warfare do not meet the threshold for a qualifying military action under the specified terms.
As of late August 2026, no qualifying military action — a direct Israeli air strike on Iran or an Iranian surface-to-surface missile or air strike impacting Israeli territory — appears to have occurred since the market was created in mid-July 2026, consistent with the ceasefire that has broadly held since the June 2025 twelve-day war. Live web verification was unavailable in this session, so the assessment rests on the historical pattern since June 2025: both states have avoided renewed direct strikes, with friction channeled through proxies, rhetoric, and intercepted or non-qualifying attacks. With roughly one month remaining to September 30, 2026, the base rate of a renewed state-on-state strike is modest, so the ceasefire is more likely than not to hold, though renewed escalation over Iran's nuclear program is a real risk.
As of late August 2026, the Israel–Iran ceasefire that followed the June 2025 twelve-day war remains formally in effect, with no verified qualifying air or surface-to-surface missile strike impacting either country’s terrestrial territory since that truce. The market’s bar is high: intercepted munitions, proxy activity, cyber operations, threats, and most artillery/rocket fire do not count. Remaining weeks through 30 September 2026 IRST still carry non-trivial restart risk, but the narrow resolution criteria, U.S. and regional de-escalation pressure, and the absence of a confirmed qualifying strike to date make continuation more likely than not.
As of the Aug 28 cutoff, direct Israel-Iran homeland strikes have paused roughly four weeks amid an informal 'no war, no peace' standoff, but the war is unresolved and prior truces collapsed quickly, making a renewed direct exchange before Sep 30 marginally more likely than not.
Recent reports indicate mutual strikes between Israel and Iran, with both sides signaling a halt but maintaining readiness for further action. The situation remains volatile, and there is no definitive evidence of a sustained ceasefire through September 30.
As of August 28, 2026, active hostilities between Israel and Iran persist, violating the ceasefire condition. Recent reports confirm ongoing Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon targeting Hezbollah (an Iranian ally) and continued missile exchanges or threats between Iran and Israel/US forces. Specifically, on August 28, Israeli airstrikes were reported in Southern Lebanon, and tensions remain high with Iran vowing harsh responses to US actions. The conflict has not stabilized into a ceasefire that holds through the end of September; rather, it is characterized by continuous low-to-medium intensity conflict and periodic escalations, including recent US-Iran strikes in July and August. Given the definition of 'qualifying military action' includes direct impacts from air strikes or missiles, and considering the frequent cross-border attacks involving Iranian proxies and direct Iranian-Israeli exchanges reported throughout 2026, the probability of a clean ceasefire holding without any qualifying incident for the next month is extremely low.
The Israel-Iran ceasefire (as defined by the market) will not continue through September 30, 2026, because multiple qualifying military actions (Iranian missile strikes on Israel August 25-26 and Israeli airstrike on Iran August 28) have already directly impacted each other's territory, breaking the ceasefire before the cutoff date.
Resolves No. The Israel–Iran ceasefire underpinning this market no longer exists: it collapsed inside the market window, well before 11:59 PM IRST on September 30, 2026. The June 2026 ceasefire began unraveling in early August — The Sun Nigeria reported on August 4 that Iran and Israel were exchanging fresh strikes 'as ceasefire unravels.' Israeli air strikes then hit Iran directly (Jüdische Allgemeine, Aug 15: Israel striking 'the Iranian regime'; Iran's state-run Mehr News tagged 'Israel attack on Iran' on Aug 17 and 'US-Israeli aggression on Iran' on Aug 18), while Iran launched ballistic-missile attacks on Israel (Ahram, Aug 16, after the Beirut strike; further waves around Aug 20–22 that wounded seven people in Israel, per Daily Jang). By Aug 27–28 the conflict was an active six-month war at stalemate: Iran refused IAEA access, Trump rejected a return to the June ceasefire terms, and oil prices jumped on the breakdown. Under the resolution rules, one qualifying air or missile strike by Israel or Iran that impacts the other's territory between market creation and Sept 30 means the ceasefire is 'no longer in effect'; such strikes — in both directions, with direct impacts and casualties — have already occurred. 'Yes' is effectively ruled out.
NO. An official IDF account published before the cutoff says that, during the preceding week, Israeli fighter jets conducted several long-range air strikes deep inside Iran and that Israeli aircraft struck ballistic-missile production facilities at Parchin and Shahrud. These are executed Israeli air strikes directly impacting terrestrial Iranian territory after the market’s July 16 creation date, satisfying the market’s qualifying-military-action definition and ending the relevant state of ceasefire. [web:53] The broader conflict environment was also assessed as worsening, with continuing alleged violations and unresolved hostilities. [web:69]
This market will resolve to "Yes" if a state of ceasefire remains in effect between Israel and Iran through the listed date, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time (IRST). Otherwise this market will resolve to “No”. A state of ceasefire will be considered to no longer be in effect between Israel and Iran if either Israel or Iran takes a qualifying military action against the other country between market creation and the listed date, 11:59 PM IRST. A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by Israel or Iran, that directly impacts the other country. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles. The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action: Munitions destroyed or intercepted before impact; Surface-to-air missile strikes; Small-arms fire; Ground incursions; Cyber operations; Naval gunfire and artillery fire; Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems); Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes; Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed. Any munition that is intercepted or destroyed before impact does not constitute a qualifying military action. Debris, fragments, or any wreckage from intercepted munitions that land on Israel or Iran do not constitute a military action regardless of any damage incurred. A military action will be considered to impact Israel or Iran if it directly impacts the terrestrial territory of Israel or Iran, including any internal waters. Maritime territory and airspace are not encompassed. Where territorial borders are disputed, all territory claimed by and under the de facto control of the relevant state as of market creation will qualify. The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (IRST) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. If, at the end of the third calendar day, conflicting reports remain as to the occurrence, attribution, or timing of the action, this market will resolve based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of Israel and Iran and credible reporting.